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Nosological classification in psychiatry, as it is currently
applied, does not facilitate biological and psychopharma-
cological research.
• Syndromal acuity has disappeared. Consequently, it is
impossible to determine: (i) whether a particular drug
affects a particular symptom configuration; (ii) what exact-
ly the behavioral correlate of a particular biological dis-
turbance is. The problem of unfocused diagnoses is great-
ly magnified by the phenomenon called comorbidity. 
•  The boundary between distress and disorder is ill-
defined.
• Symptom configuration and certain nonsymptomatolog-
ical variables such as duration and severity are prema-
turely linked, so as to conceptualize categorical entities.
The validity of those constructs has not been sufficiently
demonstrated. This undermines the validity of biological
studies and leads to “nosologomania,” ie, an ever-grow-
ing series of undervalidated psychiatric “disorders.”
• Symptoms are grouped horizontally as if they all had the
same diagnostic “valence.” This, however, is highly
unlikely.
• The nosological disease model is unconditionally and
uncritically accepted. Alternative models are ignored,
particularly the reaction-form model, though it has sub-
stantial heuristic value, and deserves to be thoroughly
scrutinized.
(Research) strategies to remedy this situation are pointed out.
Premises of the nosological 
disease model
he nosological disease model has dominated
psychiatry ever since its introduction in 1863 by
Kahlbaum.
1 However,this model is not an empirical one,
based as it is on the core premise that disturbances of
the “psychic apparatus”manifest themselves as discrete
entities. In actual fact, this core premise itself rests on
two “subpremises.”
The first “subpremise” is that psychiatric disorders are
characterized by a particular symptomatology,course,out-
come, treatment response, and, in principle, pathophysi-
ology.The words “in principle”are important to stress that
little is known, so far, about the neurobiological basis of
mental disorders.The word “particular”implies that men-
tal disorders are intrinsically stable, so that recognizing a
particular type of syndrome allows reliable predictions to
be made concerning course,outcome,treatment response,
and (in principle) pathophysiology,and,conversely,that if
the pathophysiology is known, then predictions can be
made relative to possible type(s) of resulting syndrome(s),
course,outcome,and treatment response.
The second “subpremise” postulates that each disease
entity can be distinguished and individualized with
respect to neighboring diagnostic constructs.
It is therefore based on this core premise and its two
attendant “subpremises”that mental diseases have been
conceived of as discrete entities, and that, accordingly,
diverse taxonomic classifications of mental disorders
have been put forward.
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The nosological disease model encountered its first seri-
ous opponent with the advent of psychoanalytical philos-
ophy during the first half of the 20th century.This school
of thought regarded (deviant) psychological development
and related inner conflicts as the decisive generators of
abnormal behavior, and set itself the task of analyzing
and diagnosing them. Phenomenology was deemed of
subordinate importance, and pathophysiology inconse-
quential. By definition, an individual’s life course and
inner conflicts are essentially unique,making generaliza-
tions about mental disorders well-nigh impossible, and a
taxonomy of mental disorders virtually meaningless. Of
particular note is the fact that psychoanalytic schools
remained mostly outside mainstream academic psychi-
atric centers in Europe,whereas in the USA they were to
dominate academic psychiatry for many years.
During the 70s,a nosological revival set in,heralded by
the publication of Feighner’s Research Diagnostic Cri-
teria (1972),
2 which reached its pinnacle in 1980 with
the publication of the 3rd edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III).The
taxonomy of DSM-III was constructed on nosological
principles and defined a large number of discrete dis-
orders based on symptomatological and some non-
symptomatological criteria, such as duration, severity,
and course. The DSM system was based on consensus
opinion and reviews of the literature rather than on sys-
tematic empirical studies.This was inevitable inasmuch
as doing otherwise would have set back for years the
publication of the first operationalized and standard-
ized psychiatric taxonomy. Since DSM-III there have
been two revisions (DSM-III-R and DSM-IV),yet with-
out confirmation of the numerous diagnostic constructs
that had been introduced. Validating studies were
unable to keep pace with the rate of publication of new
versions, and the field studies carried out toward this
end were simply insufficient.
The  International Classification of Diseases (ICD),
drawn up by the World Health Organization (WHO),
followed a similar fate. The 10th edition of the ICD
(ICD-10), completed in the 80s, operationalized the
diagnostic criteria for mental diseases and formulated
decision trees to arrive at particular diagnoses. ICD-10
was likewise based on expert opinion and reviews of the
literature.Experts from some 40 countries were involved
in the project. A steering committee coordinated the
activities of the different working groups, and the revi-
sion was finally put before and approved by a combined
WHO/Adamha conference in 1985. For both DSM-IV
and ICD-10, primary care versions are available, in
which diagnostic criteria are simplified,several subtypes
eliminated, and emphasis is placed on conditions
encountered in everyday practice. Only in the case of
ICD-10 was a version for researchers published,in which
diagnostic criteria were defined in greater detail (DCR-
10). Like the DSM, the ICD system has a multiaxial
structure,but the axes differ in both publications.
Sustained efforts are being made to homogenize the two
classification systems where possible. DSM is far more
used in psychiatric research than the ICD system,which
explains why the following analysis is DSM-oriented.
Nevertheless,most of the considerations presented here
are applicable to the ICD taxonomy as well.
Psychiatric diagnosing: 
past and present
Some 40 years ago, the framework of psychiatric diag-
noses was profoundly different from the way it looks
today. On the one hand we gained, on the other hand
we lost.
Then, psychiatric diagnoses were chaotic, in that stan-
dardized and generally accepted diagnostic criteria were
lacking.Without too much exaggeration one could claim
that every “school” of some renown had established its
own taxonomy.Hence diagnoses were poorly compara-
ble. Methods to assess abnormal human behavior were
nonexistent. This situation was rather disastrous for
research,particularly biological research,dependent as it
is on a precise and valid definition of the object of study.
Diagnoses at that time were inaccurate, but refined, at
least in Europe,due to the two dominant philosophies in
psychiatry back in those days: phenomenology and psy-
choanalysis. In order to make a diagnosis, one was
required:
• to provide a detailed account of the symptomatology
of a given patient;
• to pay due attention to the experiential consequences
of the symptoms;
• to describe in detail the psychogenesis of the disor-
der, ie, the alleged relationship between the complex:
psychological development/personality structure/psy-
chotraumatic event on the one hand, and the present
psychopathology on the other.
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In 1980, the third edition of the DSM appeared and
the changes it brought about were profound. In a way
they signified immense progress. A standardized and
operationalized taxonomy was introduced that gained
worldwide acceptance almost overnight by the psychi-
atric community, clinicians, and researchers alike.
However,the price that had to be paid for those bene-
fits was high, in that the diagnostic process coarsened
and markedly lost out in terms of sophistication, a
statement that will be clarified in the next section.
Is this accusation a fair one? Can a classification system
be blamed for shortcomings in the way we make a
diagnosis? After all, classification of psychiatric disor-
ders is,or rather ought to be,the end point of the diag-
nostic process,in which all data concerning symptoma-
tology, causation, and course of a psychopathological
condition crystallize in a single construct. In actual
practice,however,classification is much more than that.
To a considerable degree classification systems steer
the diagnostic process. Psychopathological data tend
to be viewed and interpreted in such a way as to fit as
far as possible the diagnostic categories available.
The impact of classification on the diagnostic process
is more profound the stricter and more detailed a
taxonomic system spells out the diagnostic criteria.
The influence that the DSM has exerted on the diag-
nostic process from the third edition onwards is a
case in point.
Our trainees learn, as it were,to diagnose with a copy
of the DSM in their hand or at least at the back of their
mind.That which is not included in the DSM seems to
have become almost irrelevant.
Since classification impacts on the making of a diag-
nosis, and since precise and valid diagnoses form the
very bedrock of clinical psychopharmacology and bio-
logical psychiatry,classification has had and continues
to have a profound influence on the development of
those disciplines. Progress is slowed down if the defi-
nition of a diagnostic category is loose,if its validity is
in doubt,or if available diagnostic categories do not fit
clinical observations.
In the following sections, I shall endeavor to show to
what extent the current diagnostic system has furthered
or impeded progress. The group of mood disorders, in
particular the construct of major depression,will be used
as a paradigm,but the same reasoning can be applied to
most of the diagnostic constructs currently distinguished.
Problems of validity
Predictive validity is the basic quality any diagnostic
construct should possess.A diagnosis,once made,should
allow reliable prognostication of symptoms, cause,
course, outcome, and response to treatment. This is
clearly not the case as far as the diagnostic construct of
major depression is concerned:
•The diagnosis of major depression is based on evidenc-
ing X out of a series of Y symptoms, irrespective of
which ones.This construct therefore encompasses a wide
range of syndromes without providing any information
on the type of depressive syndrome thus observed.
•Major depression can be precipitated by a variety of
etiological factors, psychological,biological,or related
to living conditions.In some instances,no precipitating
factors are demonstrable.
•With regard to pathophysiology, current hypotheses
postulate a causal role of serotonergic dysfunction and
hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis dis-
turbances.These have indeed been found to be associ-
ated with major depression in some patients,but not in
others,without these patient subgroups coinciding with
any of the currently distinguished depression subtypes.
Furthermore, disturbances of these systems are not
specific to depression, but occur in other diagnostic
categories as well.
3,4
•Course and outcome also fail to show a characteristic
pattern.
5,6 Some patients only develop a single episode,
whereas the majority of them experience several.One
patient may recover completely, another will suffer
from residual symptoms,and in another still chronicity
will set in.
7-9
•Treatment response,finally,is difficult to predict.Anti-
depressants may achieve complete recovery, partial
response, or no response at all. Psychological inter-
ventions will be helpful in some patients,or totally use-
less in others.
The construct of major depression therefore shows great
variability at almost every diagnostic level.Hence there
is no question of any predictability being associated with
the diagnostic characteristics: no single characteristic is
reliably predictive of any other.In other words,the pre-
dictive validity of this construct is all but null.
Not only does the construct of major depression encom-
pass a wide range of syndromes, but in the majority of
cases it is also associated with other disorders, most
notably personality and anxiety disorders.
10-13
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Thus it appears that major depression is not so much a
diagnostic entity as a diagnostic multiplicity. What we
have is an aggregate of disorders, which although they
do share some symptoms, are by no means congruent
and,in addition,differ in terms of course,outcome,treat-
ment response, and, one has to assume, pathophysiol-
ogy as well.
“Coarsening” of diagnosis
As mentioned above, over the past two decades diag-
noses have become more reliable but less sophisticated.
The reasons for this will now be clarified, taking the
groups of mood disorders as a paradigm.
The eclipse of syndromal exactitude
Syndromal differentiation has disappeared from the
diagnosis of depression.The major depression constructs
distinguished by the DSM—major depression and dys-
thymia—cover a variety of syndromes. Moreover, the
two lists of symptoms one can choose from are, for the
most part, similar. Symptomatologically, the constructs
resemble two unfocused and largely overlapping slides.
I believe that this is detrimental to psychiatric research,
particularly biological research. Study of the biological
determinants of abnormal behavior requires above all
precise definition of the object of study. It is highly
unlikely that the search for the pathophysiology of
vaguely defined constructs—unclearly demarcated from
adjacent entities,probably being repositories for a vari-
ety of pathological conditions—stands much chance of
success.Likewise,psychopharmacology is poorly served
by the way depression is currently diagnosed.The syn-
dromal heterogeneity of diagnostic constructs makes it
impossible to demonstrate potential syndromal or symp-
tomatological specificity of a given compound. Since a
variety of new antidepressants are under development,
several with high biological specificity and thus possi-
bly higher psychopathological specificity than the drugs
presently available, the current diagnostic system is a
hindrance to psychopharmacological progress.
Do syndromes matter in biological psychiatry and psy-
chopharmacology? They do indeed, and there is suffi-
cient evidence to justify this statement.The syndrome of
vital (or endogenous) depression,for instance,is a better
candidate for tricyclic antidepressants than the syn-
drome of personal (or neurotic) depression.
14,15 Vital
depression, moreover, is much less placebo-responsive
than personal depression.
16 An example of syndromal
importance for biological psychiatry is the concept of
SeCA depression (stressor-precipitated, cortisol-
induced, serotonin-related, anxiety/aggression-driven
depression), which I recently introduced. It is a new
(hypothetical) depression type characterized biologi-
cally by specific serotonergic dysfunctions and psy-
chopathologically by disturbed regulation of anxiety and
aggression, both of which are precursor symptoms of
the depression and which are considered to be the core
features of the depressive syndrome.
3
Precise syndromal differentiation seems to me the indis-
pensable counterpart of both biological and pharmaco-
logical research in psychiatry.
The comorbidity maze
Comorbidity is very widespread in psychiatry and seri-
ously undermines the validity of research efforts.
17 For
example,a depressed patient is included in a depression
protocol and also qualifies for the diagnoses of general-
ized anxiety disorder with occasional panic attacks,alco-
holism, and two or three personality disorders.A find-
ing—biological,psychopharmacological,epidemiological,
or otherwise—is made. Is this finding related to depres-
sion, to one of the other diagnoses, or to components of
the syndromes covered by these diagnostic labels?
Answers are not on hand.The problem is most often
ignored,thus disqualifying most conclusions.
A sensible way to avoid the morass of comorbidity in
experimental psychiatry and more particularly in bio-
logical psychiatry,is the strategy I have called function-
alization of diagnoses.
18 Diagnosing in psychiatry is gen-
erally confined to two tiers: characterization of the
prevailing syndrome(s),and a decision as to the best fit-
ting categorical diagnosis or diagnoses. The diagnostic
process in psychiatry can be widened using a third tier,
that of functional psychopathology.This is achieved by
dissecting the syndrome into what may be considered
the elementary units of psychopathology,ie,the psycho-
logical dysfunctions underlying psychiatric symptoms.
In a case of depression, for instance, these dysfunctions
include disturbances in the regulation of mood,anxiety,
and aggression,motoricity,information processing,mem-
ory,hedonic functioning,concentration,and others.Psy-
chiatric symptoms are the manifestations of psycholog-
ical dysfunctions. For example, hearing voices is a
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symptom; a particular perceptual disturbance is the
underlying psychological dysfunction.Functional analy-
sis of a psychiatric syndrome is,thus,fundamentally dif-
ferent from symptom analysis.
“Functionalization” of psychiatric diagnoses is impor-
tant for several reasons. First, the problem of comor-
bidly occurring disorders is bypassed (not resolved) by
relinquishing the concept of discrete and separate dis-
orders and studying primarily the biology and psy-
chopharmacology of abnormally functioning psycho-
logical domains. Second, this approach provides insight
into the functional abilities of the patient,ie,which psy-
chological domains are deranged and which are still
functioning within normal limits. Third, psychological
dysfunctions are measurable, many of them quantita-
tively.This is in contrast to psychiatric syndromes or dis-
orders, which permit, at best, a qualitative estimate of
presence and severity. Functionalization is the obvious
way to provide psychiatric diagnoses with a sound sci-
entific foundation. If systematically carried through,
functional psychopathology will ultimately lead to the
equivalent of what pathophysiology is to somatic medi-
cine: the discipline providing an understanding of the
deflections in the psychological apparatus that underlie
a particular psychiatric disorder.
Horizontal instead of vertical grouping 
of psychopathological phenomena
In present-day psychiatry,symptoms tend to be grouped
horizontally,as if each carried equal diagnostic weight—
we just count symptoms. Mood disorders are no excep-
tion to this rule. This approach resembles that of the
internist who, in a case of pneumonia, would attach the
same diagnostic valence to the symptom of fatigue as
to the symptom of shortness of breath.In medicine,such
an approach would be labeled malpractice.In psychiatry
it is officially sanctioned.
A mental disorder can be considered as a composite of
psychological dysfunctions, mutually interacting in a
complex way.The diagnostic weight of the various com-
ponents is presumably unequal. Some of them are pri-
mary,ie,the direct consequence of the underlying cere-
bral substratum; others are secondary, ie, derivatives of
the pathophysiological processes. Primary symptoms
should be the prime target of research into the biology
of the disorder and of therapeutic interventions, given
their availability.
Since the work of Eugen Bleuler, the fundamental dis-
tinction between primary and secondary symptoms has
received hardly any attention. The reason is not diffi-
cult to guess: because there were no methods to study
the brain,it was virtually impossible to validate the pri-
mary/secondary distinction. As a result of advances in
biological psychiatry and psychopathology, that argu-
ment no longer holds good. Our studies in mood disor-
ders are a case in point.They led us,as mentioned above,
to the hypothesis that a subgroup of depression exists in
which:(i) serotonergic functioning is demonstrably dis-
turbed; (ii) anxiety and/or aggression dysregulation are
the primary psychopathological features and mood-low-
ering the subsidiary ones; and (iii) serotonergic dys-
function and affective vulnerability are causally linked.
If true, the proper treatment of such serotonin-related,
anxiety/aggression-driven forms of depression would be
a compound that ameliorates anxiety and/or aggression
via regulation of serotonergic circuits.
3 Verticalization
of psychiatric diagnoses could fundamentally change the
strategy for developing novel psychopharmacological
principles. Instead of finding drugs to fight disorders
such as schizophrenia or major depression, the goal
would shift towards the development of drugs that reg-
ulate core types of psychological dysfunction underlying
a particular psychopathological state.
Verticalization studies presuppose careful dissection of
the prevailing syndrome into its component parts: the
psychological dysfunctions. This is another reason why
the functional approach should be an integral part of
making a psychiatric diagnosis.
Neglect of psychogenesis
A fundamental shortcoming of the prevailing psychi-
atric taxonomy is the lack of an etiological axis. The
rationale for this is the wish to be atheoretical. With
today’s methodologies,however,it is possible to put for-
ward an etiological hypothesis that is as reliable as any
on the presence or absence and severity of particular
psychopathological symptoms.
What is most particularly missing is the requirement to
formulate a hypothesis on the relationship between axis
I and axis II diagnoses.In this context,is the frequent co-
occurrence of depression and the complex stressors/per-
sonality imperfections a mere coincidence or is it of
causal significance in that the latter complex is the pace-
maker of the depression? If a causal relationship is prob-
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able,biological research into depression (or a particular
type of depression) should focus primarily on the deter-
minants of personality disorder rather than on those of
depression.
This issue is of no less practical importance.If personal-
ity disorder constitutes the primary pathology,its treat-
ment should be a integral part of the management of
(certain types) of depression. Consequently, a refined
diagnosis of depression should encompass diagnostic
scrutiny of personality structure, its possible frailties,
and the corresponding life events.
In summary, the practice of judging axes I, II, and IV
independently ignores the possibility—probability
even—that in depression these three domains broadly
overlap, and does not lend itself to the formulation of
hypotheses or the carrying out of corresponding
research. In psychodynamic psychiatry, relationships
between mood,personality,and life events are taken for
granted. In experimental psychiatry, belief in the self-
evident has been lost, but with the diagnostic approach
that it champions, the remedy could become as serious
as the disease.
Categories and clinical realities
Finally, the question should be raised as to what extent
the multiplicity of available diagnoses adequately covers
the real situation of the individuals who attend our clin-
ics and therapeutic units.
Proliferation of diagnostic categories
From the third edition onwards,the DSM has standard-
ized diagnoses and operationalized diagnostic criteria.
Precise syndromal definition has been abandoned, and
the diagnosis of depression is tied to a fixed number of
symptoms from a given series, regardless of the actual
symptoms. Various depression types are distinguished,
not on the basis of symptoms, but on their severity and
duration.Major depression is defined as severe (at least
more severe than dysthymia), time-limited, and of at
least 2 weeks’ duration, while dysthymia is defined as a
less severe, long-lasting mood anomaly. In this way, the
DSM system creates “disorders,” characterized by a
compilation of nonsymptomatological and (crude)
symptomatological criteria.
The dangers of this system are substantial.The number
of symptoms necessary to qualify for a particular diag-
nosis has been determined arbitrarily. A considerable
number of syndromes qualify for the same diagnosis.
Moreover, much evidence indicates that the diagnostic
constructs thus defined have little predictive validity as
to their course, outcome, or treatment response.
14 For
instance, major depression can occur once in a lifetime
or be recurrent; it may remit completely or partially;
antidepressants may be efficacious or inactive;and psy-
chological interventions effective or to no avail.
The rigidity of the system and the discrepancies between
diagnostic constructs and clinical realities have fueled
the need for novel categories of depression. Thus, if
instead of showing 5 out of the 9 symptoms listed  under
the heading major depression the patient has only 2 to 4,
the diagnosis changes from major depression to subsyn-
dromal depressive disorder.
19 Individuals with only one
depressive syndrome are also included in depression
studies, though to date they are so far diagnostically
unclassified.
20 If the severity is less than that required
for major depression and the duration less than that
required for dysthymia, the diagnosis changes to minor
depression.Severity criteria,however,are not specified.
If episodes are recurrent and brief (less than 2 weeks),
brief recurrent depression is diagnosed.
21 Brief episodes
not rapidly recurrent have so far not received a cate-
gorical position. Entities such as those mentioned are
currently studied epidemiologically, psychopharmaco-
logically,and otherwise as if they were discrete and sep-
arable entities, or discrete and separable subforms of
one overarching entity (see,for example,reference 22).
Are those diagnostic constructs true categories, or arte-
facts generated by a diagnostic system based on noso-
logical premises that prematurely and erroneously con-
ceptualize diagnostic “packages,” which, however, lack
clinical relevance? This is still a moot question,but before
accepting these packages as valid diagnoses, one should
consider and exclude other explanations for the wide
spectrum of mood disturbances encountered in clinical
practice, besides the DSM-defined categories. I will
briefly discuss three alternative explanations for noso-
logical diversity that deserve serious scientific attention.
Worrying is mistaken for depression
People may go through difficult periods and may com-
plain in the face of severe problems once in a lifetime,
repeatedly, or chronically.At what point does worrying
cease to be worrying and turn into depression? The
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answer is not known.Psychiatry has failed to study these
gray areas systematically.Hence the need to define ever
more categories of mood anomalies, particularly with
respect to milder forms. Boundary setting, however, is
lacking.Is one symptom enough to qualify for the diag-
nosis of depression or are two enough or should there be
a fixed minimum? Is symptom severity a critical feature,
and, if so, how should it be defined: in terms of disrup-
tion of social and occupational life,decreasing work per-
formance,subjective experience,or observer ratings? Is
duration decisive and, if so, what should be the cutoff
time? Due to the lack of answers, diagnostic categories
have proliferated.
This state of affairs seriously undermines the validity of
research data. How can we have confidence in the out-
come of epidemiological studies if distress and depres-
sion are not clearly distinguishable, but are neverthe-
less distinguished? This is all the more relevant if the
study has been carried out by lay interviewers,with only
a brief training and without psychiatric experience,using
highly structured,standard interviews of modest clinical
sophistication and with only two answers allowed per
question:affirmative or negative.I am alluding to instru-
ments such as the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS)
23
and the Composite International Diagnostic Interview
(CIDI).
24They have been used in several large-scale epi-
demiological studies, though poor agreement has been
demonstrated between diagnoses based on interviews
conducted by lay persons and diagnoses made by psy-
chiatrists.
25,26
How can one explore the biological determinants of
depression or the clinical effects of antidepressants if
the study group is composed of depressives and worri-
ers? The pathological substrate of pneumonia and the
efficacy of penicillin would not have been clarified if
patients with pneumonia and those with a common cold
had been confused.
Boundary problems should thus have high priority in
depression research, but regretfully they have not.The
fact that ever more depression categories are being pro-
posed does not provide much solace.
Partial response is held to be a new depression type
It is generally held that in 60% to 70% of cases depres-
sion responds favorably to antidepressants,and this seems
to be true for all types of antidepressants. Response to
antidepressants is generally defined in terms of rating-
scale scores. For instance, a reduction in the Hamilton
score of at least 50% identifies someone as a responder.
However, more often than not, symptoms attenuate, but
do not disappear,or some symptoms disappear but others
persist.
27 This might have led to proposals for new, so-
called subsyndromal depression categories.
Another diagnostic riposte to partial response (a euphe-
mism for partial failure) is the postulate of two depres-
sion types occurring together,one responding to the pre-
scribed antidepressant while the other one does not. I
am alluding to the concept of double depression, ie,
major depression superimposed on dysthymia.
22 Symp-
tomatologically, however, major depression and dys-
thymia are virtually indistinguishable, differing princi-
pally only in severity and duration. How then can one
decide whether residual depressive symptoms are the
remnants of major depression or continuing dysthymia?
Incomplete response is,I believe,a more plausible expla-
nation for residual symptoms than the assumption of
new depression types, especially since those novel con-
structs have, in no time, become the subject of study in
their own right.
Unsuitability of nosology 
for ordering mental pathology
Since its inception as a scientific discipline by Krae-
pelin, psychiatry has been wedded to nosology as the
classificatory principle of mental pathology. Research
in psychiatry is disorder-oriented, particularly in bio-
logical psychiatry, where the search for markers and
possible causes of true disorders, like schizophrenia,
major depression, or panic disorder is the major goal.
As I have argued elsewhere, abnormal psychic states
can be conceived of in a different way, ie, as reaction
patterns to noxious stimuli.
28 Noxious stimuli will dis-
turb a variety of neuronal circuits and,hence,a variety
of psychological systems.The extent to which neuronal
disruption will be induced by a noxious stimulus is vari-
able, because it is influenced by personality strength
and neuronal adaptability. Psychiatric conditions will
therefore lack symptomatological consistency and pre-
dictability.For instance,mood lowering is blended with
fluctuating measures of anxiety, anger, obsessional
thoughts,addictive behavior,cognitive impairment,and
psychotic features.These features will vary in intensity
and prominence between subjects and, over time,
within the same individual. The need to demarcate
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depression categories is thus never-ending and in
essence futile.
The reaction-form model provides an explanation for
several other urgent questions facing psychiatry. First,
the question as to why most psychiatric patients seem
to suffer from a multitude of disorders. According to
this model,the co-occurrence of various discrete men-
tal disorders is mainly appearance.In fact,we are deal-
ing with ever-changing composites of psychopatholog-
ical features. Secondly, the reaction-form model offers
an explanation for why, in spite of more than 35 years
of intense efforts, no biological markers of categorical
entities have been established, whereas the search for
correlations between psychological and biological dys-
functions has been quite successful.
The reaction-form model, if valid, would have profound
consequences for biological psychiatry.The search for mark-
ers and, eventually, causes of discrete mental disorders
would be largely futile.The most one could do would be to
group the multitude of reaction patterns in a limited number
of diagnostic “basins,” such as the group of the psychotic,
demential,and affective reaction forms,each of which,how-
ever, would show considerable heterogeneity. Just as it is
futile to search for the antecedents and characteristics of,for
example, the group of abdominal disorders, so it would
equally be foolhardy to hope for the discovery of, eg, the
pathophysiology of the “basin” of affective reaction forms.
Within the scope of this model, the focus of biological psy-
chiatric research has to shift from the alleged mental “dis-
orders”to disordered psychological domains.It is not schiz-
ophrenia, panic disorder, or major depression as such that
will be studied,but disturbances in perception,information
processing,mood regulation,anxiety regulation,and impulse
control, to name but a few.A biology of psychological dys-
functions as they occur in dysfunctional mental states would
thus be the ultimate goal of biological psychiatric research.
Adopting the three-tier diagnostic approach in psychi-
atry (adding the “functional” level) would offer the
opportunity to explore the relative merits of both diag-
nostic viewpoints—the nosological and the reaction-
form model—for experimental psychiatry.
Discussion 
Depression research
Before the publication of the third edition of the DSM,
the diagnosis of depression was weak in that terminol-
ogy was not standardized and criteria were not opera-
tionalized,but it was strong in that symptomatological
analysis was refined (at least in Europe, where phe-
nomenology was in vogue) and etiological analysis
prominent (particularly psychogenesis, officered by
psychodynamic thinking).At the current time,the diag-
nosis of depression is strong in that standards are sys-
tematized and defined, but is weak in that syndromal
specification has been relinquished and axis I, II, and
IV data are left unconnected.
Research,and particularly biological research,is greatly
hampered by these shortcomings. The depression con-
structs we study are symptomatologically ill-defined and
heterogenous.It is unlikely that they can be considered as
“entities” whose features such as biology, genetics, epi-
demiology,or treatment responses can be properly stud-
ied.Moreover,clinical practice indicates that depression,
(some) personality deviations, and stressor susceptibil-
ity are so tightly interwoven that a hypothesis about their
possible interrelationship seems indispensable, not only
in terms of treatment, but for the sake of research as
well.If it was shown to be plausible that (certain types of)
depression (are) is the consequence of personality frail-
ties and corresponding life events, research into the ori-
gin of depression would have to shift from depression
per se to the underlying personality disorder.
Overlap of disorders
What severely hampers depression research is the fact
that depression rarely occurs in isolation. The overlap
between mood, anxiety, and personality disorders is so
fundamental that discussion of any depression study
should include whether the observed phenomena relate
to depression, to coexisting anxiety or personality disor-
ders,or to components of these conditions.Generally,this
question is carefully avoided—avoidance behavior,how-
ever,does not promote progress.
Horizontal vs vertical approach
The diagnosis of depression has regressed to a horizon-
tal level.Symptoms are simply counted,and if a certain
number from a given series are present, depression is
considered to exist.The essence of making a diagnosis,
however, involves a vertical approach ranking symp-
toms according to their relationship to the pathophysio-
logical substratum underlying a particular psychopatho-
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logical condition.Symptoms directly related to the sub-
stratum should be the prime target of treatment efforts
and pathogenetic research.
A prerequisite for the verticalization of diagnosis is func-
tionalization of diagnosis,ie,dissection of the prevailing
syndrome(s) into its (their) component parts—in other
words,a series of psychological dysfunctions.Those dys-
functions should be charted and measured, whenever
possible quantitavely. Functionalization of diagnoses
would raise psychopathology to a true scientific level.
New diagnostic categories
Present-day psychiatric taxonomy is based on nosologi-
cal premises. Mental disorders are considered as dis-
crete entities. For the diagnosis of depression, this phi-
losophy has acted as a straitjacket,for two reasons.First,
many mood disorders could not be accommodated in
the available categories, and second, the boundary
between distress and depression appeared hard to iden-
tify. Consequently, there was a need to propose ever
more new depression categories, each viewed as an
entity in its own right and studied as such. Validity
research has, however, not kept pace. This is why this
“nosologomania”
29 has brought about a strong infla-
tionary trend in depression diagnosis.Moreover,the pro-
liferation of ever more diagnostic categories has magni-
fied the problems caused by comorbidity.
Validity of the nosological disease model
The considerable overlap between mood, anxiety, and
(certain) personality disorders raises a question of a fun-
damental nature, that of the validity of the nosological
disease model for depression diagnosis.Can the pathol-
ogy of affect regulation indeed be subdivided into dis-
crete entities, or is an alternative disease model, ie, the
reaction-form model, more appropriate and of greater
heuristic value? According to the latter model, affect
pathology does not crystallize into discrete “packages,”
but manifests itself in inter- and intra-individually ever-
changing combinations of mood,anxiety,and aggression
pathologies. This model provides answers for burning
questions where the nosological model remains silent.
Why do most patients with affective pathologies qualify
for a host of disorders? Why, after searching for more
than 35 years,has not a single biological marker for any
disease entity been found? 
The answer,according to the reaction-form model,is that
the so-called “disorders” are artefacts of a categorical
classification philosophy and not real disease entities.Dis-
ordered psychological domains (and in particular those
that are directly correlated with the brain dysfunction
underlying a particular state of psychological disorgani-
zation) should take center stage in biological psychiatry
and psychopharmacology. Functional psychopharmacol-
ogy, ie, treatment of psychological dysfunctions rather
than (pseudo)disorders would be the “therapeutic arm”of
the reaction-form disease model.
The heuristic value of the reaction-form model is such
that it should be studied comparatively as a possible
counterpart to the nosological model.
29
Guidelines for diagnosis of depression
To avoid the pitfalls discussed here, the diagnosis of
depression has to be based on the following pillars: (i)
refined syndromal characterization;(ii) introduction of a
third (functional) tier in the diagnostic process;(iii) for-
mulation of hypotheses regarding the relation between
axis I and II diagnoses; and (iv) systematic study of the
“vertical position”of the various psychological dysfunc-
tions constituting the depressive syndrome.
Conclusion
The present discussion has focused on the diagnosis of
depression.Much of what has been said is valid for psy-
chiatric diagnoses in general. Hence I believe that seri-
ous investigation of the very foundations of our disci-
pline,ie,diagnosis,is indicated.
4  ❏
Based on lectures given at the Congress of the Association of European Psy-
chiatrists held in Copenhagen, September 20-25, 1998 and at the Annual
Meeting of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists,
Christchurch, New Zealand, September 3-7, 1997.
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El impacto de la clasificación en la
psicofarmacología y en la psiquiatría
biológica
La clasificación nosológica en psiquiatría,tal como se
aplica actualmente, no facilita la investigación bioló-
gica ni psicofarmacológica.
•  La precisión sindromática ha desaparecido. Por
consecuencia, es imposible determinar: a) si un fár-
maco dado afecta una configuración sintomática
específica,b) cuán exacta es la correlación entre una
conducta y un trastorno biológico determinado. El
problema de los diagnósticos imprecisos está
aumentado por el fenómeno de la comorbilidad.
• El límite entre distrés y trastorno está mal definido.
• La configuración sintomática y ciertas variables no
sintomatológicas como duración y gravedad se rela-
cionan prematuramente con el fin de conceptualizar
categorías nosológicas.La validez de estos construc-
tos no se ha demostrado suficientemente. Esto
destruye la validez de los estudios biológicos y con-
duce a una “nosologomanía”, es decir, a una serie
siempre creciente de “trastornos” psiquiátricos sub-
validados.
•  Los síntomas se agrupan de manera horizontal
como como si todos ellos tuvieran la misma “valen-
cia”diagnóstica,lo que parece muy poco probable.
•  El modelo nosológico de enfermedad se acepta
incondicionalmente y con escasas críticas.Se ignoran
los modelos alternativos, especialmente el modelo de
tipo reaccional, a pesar que posee un gran valor
heurístico y por lo tanto merece ser bien explorado.
En este artículo se proponen estrategias (de investi-
gación) para remediar esta situación.
Impact de la classification sur la
psychopharmacologie et la psychiatrie
biologique
La classification nosologique en psychiatrie, telle
qu’elle est actuellement utilisée, ne facilite pas la
recherche biologique et psychopharmacologique.
• L’acuité du syndrome n’existe plus. Par conséquent,
il est impossible de déterminer : a) si un type parti-
culier de médicament influe sur une configuration
symptomatique particulière;b) quelle est la manifes-
tation comportementale exacte d’un trouble
biologique particulier.Le problème de l’imprécision
diagnostique est considérablement amplifié par le 
concept de comorbidité.
• La limite entre souffrance et maladie est mal définie.
• La configuration des symptômes et certaines vari-
ables non symptomatiques telles que la durée et la
sévérité sont liées de façon prématurée afin de con-
ceptualiser des entités catégorielles.La validité de ces
entités n’a pas été suffisamment démontrée. Ceci
affaiblit la validité des études biologiques et conduit
à une “nosologimanie”, c’est-à-dire, une série tou-
jours en augmentation de “troubles” psychiatriques
sous-validés.
• Les symptômes sont groupés de façon horizontale
comme s’ils avaient tous la même “valence” dia-
gnostique,ce qui est,néanmoins,très improbable.
• Le modèle nosologique de la maladie est accepté de
façon inconditionnelle et sans critique. Les modèles
alternatifs ne sont pas pris en compte, en particulier
le modèle “forme réactionnelle”, bien qu’il ait une
valeur heuristique considérable et mérite d’être
examiné rigoureusement.
Des stratégies (de recherche) pour remédier à cette 
situation sont énumérées.151
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